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Abstract
Driven by methodological concerns, theoretical considerations, and previous evidence, we sys-
tematically test the validity of common dictator-game variants with probabilistic incentives.
We include four approaches and compare them to a standard dictator game: involving fewer re-
ceivers than dictators; paying only some subjects or decisions; role uncertainty at the time of the
transfer decision. We also relate the dictator-game variants to established complementary indi-
vidual difference measures of pro-sociality: social value orientation, personal values, a donation
to charity, and Big Five personality factors. Our data show that dictator behavior is quite sensi-
tive to the applied methods. The standard version of the dictator game has the highest validity.
Involving fewer receivers than dictators and not paying for all decisions yields comparably valid
results. By contrast, when only some subjects are paid or when subjects face uncertainty about
their final player role, the expected associations with complementary pro-sociality measures are
distorted. Under role uncertainty, generosity is biased upwards. We conclude that the validity
of the dictator-game outcomes is highly sensitive to the applied methods.
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1 Introduction
The dictator game is a powerful and extensively used paradigm in the social sciences to study social
preferences. It is very popular because of its simplicity.1 The standard version of the dictator game
entails dyads of randomly one-to-one matched dictators and receivers. Player roles are previously
allocated by chance. The dictator takes one decision and determines her own payoff and the payoff
of the matched receiver – who is inactive – by splitting a given prize. Despite the simple structure of
the dictator game, experimenters often face constraints which complicate the implementation of the
standard variant of the dictator game: available monetary funds or laboratory resources are limited;
the number of available subjects is limited because they are scarce (e.g., managers), live in remote
areas (e.g., foreign villages), or are hardly accessible due to legal regulation (e.g., prison inmates).
Sometimes, researchers also need to make within-subject comparisons from multiple decisions, e.g.,
by contrasting a subject’s behavior across different games or in different player roles. Besides these
requests, the dictator game in some cases solely serves as a “companion game” and adds an individual
measure of generosity to the main experimental data.
To handle the above constraints and obtain the aspired data from the experimental subjects, re-
searchers modify the standard protocol of the dictator game. There are different approaches: First,
as the receiver is an inactive player, the number of receivers is reduced. An unbalanced matching is
applied such that only some dictators are actually matched with receivers (e.g., Houser and Schunk,
2009)2. Second, only some players are paid after the dictators have taken a decision (e.g., Dufwen-
berg and Muren, 2006; Holm and Engseld, 2005; Kahneman et al., 1986). Third, the dictator game
is repeated or the subjects make several similarly structured decisions, including a dictator-game
transfer, either in separate games or by applying the strategy method. For the subjects’ payoff, one
decision is randomly chosen and paid out (e.g., Ashraf et al., 2006; Cappelen et al., 2007; Eckel
and Grossman, 2000; Rankin, 2006). Fourth, introducing role uncertainty, all involved subjects first
take a decision in the role of the dictator. Afterward, actual player roles are randomly assigned, the
determined dictators are randomly matched with the receivers, and the players are paid accordingly
(e.g., Charness and Rabin, 2002; Engelmann and Strobel, 2004; see also Iriberri and Rey-Biel, 2011).
Many studies also combine random payment of decisions and role uncertainty to obtain a maximum
amount of data and to enable within-subject comparisons. In this case, the subjects take several
decisions as dictators. Afterwards, the payoff-determining decision is randomly chosen, actual player
roles are randomly assigned, players are randomly matched and paid out (e.g., Andreoni and Miller,
2002; Andreoni and Vesterlund, 2001; Ashraf et al., 2006; Blanco et al., 2011; Castillo and Cross,
2008; Charness and Rabin, 2002; Engelmann and Strobel, 2004). Fifth, in some cases, the researchers
do not offer the participants monetary incentives and let them take hypothetical decisions (Ben-Ner
et al., 2008; Bühren and Kundt, 2015; Dalbert and Umlauft, 2009; Lönnqvist et al., 2011).
In the different variants of the dictator game, a distinct randomization procedure is applied – either
with regard to the final matching of the players, how many players are actually paid, the deter-
mination of the payoff-relevant decision, or the assignment of actual player roles. The different
randomization procedures yield probabilistic incentives, i.e., different probabilities for how strongly
1For an excellent metastudy on the empirical evidence from dictator-game experiments, see Engel (2011).
2These authors do it for practical reasons, but do not reveal this to their subjects. This can be considered a
borderline case of deception. This method is also often used in social psychology experiments. There, the receivers
also often do not even exist (e.g., Batson et al., 1997, admitted on p. 1339).
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a dictator’s decision eventually determines her own payoff and that of a matched receiver. At the
same time, fewer resources, such as subjects, sessions, money, etc., are required.
In this paper, we systematically test the impact of probabilistic incentives in dictator games – in-
duced by the different forms of randomization found in the literature. Using a comprehensive and
strictly controlled approach, we study the important question whether the source of randomization,
i.e., unbalanced matching of dictators and receivers, random payment of players or decisions, or
role uncertainty, alters generosity and underlying motivations. Furthermore, we investigate how the
degree of randomization, i.e., single (e.g., in case of unbalanced matching) and multiple randomiza-
tions (e.g., in a situation with random payment of decisions and role uncertainty), interfere with the
validity of observed dictator behavior.
Our study is driven by methodological and practical considerations, in conjunction with mixed
evidence from previous studies. For example, in his metastudy on dictator-game behavior, Engel
(2011) finds that the less a dictator is sure that her intended generosity affects the receiver, the less
she transfers to the receiver. Moreover, when only some decisions of a dictator, or some dictators,
are paid at random, no significant effect on generosity is detected (see also Bolle, 1990; Laury,
2005). Engel (2011) generally uses metaregressions. However, when applying individual data or
when making different specifications in his models, the results differ (p. 591). Referring to the
random payment of decisions in their experiment (including a dictator game), Ashraf et al. (2006)
acknowledge: “While we control for design effects to the best of our ability, we cannot exclude
the possibility that our design affects behavior differently than other, more standard, designs” (p.
197). Moreover, while some studies (e.g., Engelmann and Strobel, 2004) suggest that results are
robust towards role uncertainty, Iriberri and Rey-Biel (2011), who directly study the impact of
role uncertainty in a modified dictator game, find it to overestimate the prevalence of altruistic
preferences.3 They conclude that “[...] our results definitely warn against the use of role uncertainty
in future experimental designs aiming to identify different motives behind non-selfish behavior” (p.
171). In a similar vein, Charness and Rabin (2002) admit that “Our use of role reversal and multiple
games in sessions may have generated different behavior than had each participant played just one
role in one game” (p. 827). All in all, in the context of specific forms of randomization, it remains
an open question how changing the incentive structure influences generosity and its foundations.
To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to investigate systematically the different ran-
domization procedures and their potential influence on dictator-game giving within a cohesive and
controlled experimental approach. Our study adds the following contributions to the literature: i)
We study and compare the impact of unbalanced matching, random payment of players or deci-
sions, and role uncertainty using the same dictator game in all the treatments. ii) As far as we
are aware, the role of unbalanced matching has not been studied so far. Depending on which field
expert is asked, one gets divergent answers about the appropriateness of (secretly) involving fewer
receivers than dictators with regard to deception issues or the validity of the results. iii) We include
a combination of randomly paying decisions and role uncertainty, which is often done when social
preferences are elicited. iv) To assess potential differences in the validity of dictator behavior across
dictator-game variants, we relate subjects’ generosity to alternative individual difference measures
3In a related study, Burks et al. (2003) find that playing both roles in a trust game reduces both trust and
reciprocity.
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typically associated with generosity: social value orientation, personal values, an external donation,
and Big-Five Personality factors. From this perspective, our study also provides potential new in-
sights into previous results on the existing (or non-existing) associations of generosity with other
individual differences measures.
Our data indicate that dictator behavior is quite sensitive to the specific game situation. The
standard version of the dictator game has the highest validity.4 Unbalanced matching and ran-
dom payment of decisions do not significantly change dictator behavior and are comparable to the
reference treatment without randomization. These procedures may therefore represent feasible cost-
saving alternatives for conducting dictator-game studies under ressource constraints. At first sight,
random payment of only some players does not affect the average amount transferred to the receiver.
Yet, we find that the detected behavior does not sufficiently correlate with complementary measures
of generosity. Furthermore, supporting previously expressed concerns by other researchers, role un-
certainty (without repetition) biases transfers upwards and distorts the associations typically found
with alternative measures of generosity.
The paper proceeds as follows: In the next section, we describe our experimental setup and the
specific procedures that ensure strict control and comparability of the applied dictator-game vari-
ants. We also make some theoretical considerations about the impact of probabilistic incentives
on generosity. In Section 3, we present our results by showing dictator generosity and the validity
of the distinct dictator-game variants with regard to their correlation with alternative generosity
indicators. We will also assess the characteristics of the recruited subjects and their understanding
and perception of the decision situation. In Section 4, we discuss our results.
2 The Experiment
2.1 Dictator-game variants
In all experiments, we study the same dictator game: the dictator determines the allocation of e10
among herself and a receiver by choosing an integer amount x from e0 to e10 to be given to the
receiver. The basic structure of the dictator game is described with the same standard text in the
instructions of all treatments, mapping different dictator-game variants. The treatment variations,
i.e., the different randomization procedures, were made explicit in a separate subsequent paragraph.5
We implement six treatments. We deliberately exclude purely hypothetical decisions. Paying (at
least some) subjects in the laboratory has become standard in experimental economics. It is argued
that monetary incentives ensure that participants perceive their behavior as relevant, experience
real emotions, and take decisions with real economic consequences (Falk and Heckman, 2009; Smith,
1976).6 In our treatments, we vary how 1) the dictators and the receivers are matched, 2) the
dictator decisions are payoff-relevant for either player, 3) the player roles are assigned. Table 1
provides an overview for all the treatments. It depicts their characteristics, the involved players,
4For a general debate on the interpretation of generosity in give-variants of the dictator game, refer to List, 2007.
5Instructions were provided in German. Please refer to Appendix A for the original instructions of all dictator-game
variants and an English translation.
6For the effects of the presence or absence of monetary incentives on other-regarding behavior in a dictator game,
see Bühren and Kundt (2015).
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Table 1: Experimental Treatments
Treatment Feature Subjects Dictators Receivers Sessions PD PR
N–N
Reference
treatment for all
comparisons.
64 32 32 2 1.00 1.00
N-N/2
There are fewer
receivers than
dictators.
48 32 16 2 1.00 0.50
Pay50
Only 1/2 of the
dictator-receiver
dyads are paid.
64 32 32 2 0.50 0.50
Dec50
Only one out of
two decisions from
one subject is paid.
64 32 32 2 0.50 0.50
Rol50
Uncertainty about
actual player role
during decision.
32 32 0 1 0.50 0.50
DeRo25
Combination of the
features from
Dec50 and Rol50.
32 32 0 1 0.25 0.25
Total: 304 192 112 10
Notes. PD (PR) denotes the probability for a dictator’s decision to be payoff-relevant for the respective dictator (a
randomly regarded receiver) in a specific treatment.
and the probability for a dictator’s decision to be payoff-relevant for the respective dictator and for
a randomly regarded receiver, respectively, when a dictator takes her decision in a specific dictator
game. The probabilities depend on the applied randomization procedures.
N-N – Reference Treatment: Subjects are first randomly assigned a player role (dictator or
receiver) with a probability of 1/2. After role assignment, there is the same number N of dictators
and receivers. Then, dictators and receivers are randomly matched, resulting in N dictator-receiver
dyads. This implies that the dictators’ decisions determine for certain the dictators’ and the matched
receivers’ payoffs. Finally, the dictator determines the allocation. All dictator decisions are paid. N-
N represents the most common, but also most demanding, form of dictator-game implementation.
It requires most resources (e.g., subjects, budget, time, and lab space) and serves as the “gold
standard” for our comparisons.
N-N/2 – Unbalanced Matching: In this treatment, we introduce an unbalanced matching of
dictators and receivers. First, subjects are randomly assigned a player role with a probability of
2/3 for taking the role of a dictator and with a probability of 1/3 for taking the role of a receiver.
Consequently, there are twice as many dictators than receivers. Next, dictators and receivers are
randomly matched, resulting in N/2 actual dictator-receiver dyads. N/2 of the dictators remain
actually unmatched. Dictator decisions determine their own payoffs with certainty. A receiver’s
payoff is determined only with a probability of 1/2 from the perspective of a dictator. Finally, the
dictator determines the allocation. All dictator decisions are paid (at least to the dictators). The
advantage of this treatment is, that compared to N-N and depending on the specification of the
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parameters, less receivers are needed.
Pay50 – Probabilistic Payment: First, subjects are randomly assigned a player role (dictator
or receiver) with a probability of 1/2. After role assignment, there is the same number N of
dictators and receivers. Then, dictators and receivers are randomly matched, resulting in N dictator-
receiver dyads. Finally, the dictator determines the allocation. For payoff determination, 1/2 of the
dictator-receiver groups are randomly selected and paid out. This means that the dictators’ decisions
determine their own and the matched receivers’ payoffs with a probability of 1/2. Pay50 costs less
than N-N, because only 1/2 of the subjects are actually paid.
Dec50 – Probabilistic Decision Selection: This treatment entails a second dictator-game de-
cision. First, subjects are randomly assigned a player role with a probability of 1/2. After role
assignment, there is the same amount N of dictators and receivers. Then, dictators and receivers
are randomly matched, resulting in N dictator-receiver dyads. Dictators take the same decision
as in N-N twice. For payoff determination, each decision is chosen with a probability of 1/2 and
yields the payoffs for either player. This means that a dictator’s decision in one game determines
her own payoff and the matched receiver’s payoff with a probability of 1/2. There is no intermediate
feedback provided on the outcome of the first decision.7 Relative to N-N, twice as many observations
are collected. Moreover, the data allow for within-subject comparisons using multiple decisions.
Rol50 – Role Uncertainty: Here, we implement role uncertainty. First, all subjects determine
the allocation in the role of a dictator. Then, they are randomly assigned their actual player role
with a probability of 1/2. Consequently, there are as many dictators as there are receivers (N ).
Consecutively, dictators and receivers are randomly matched, resulting in N/2 dictator-receiver
dyads. For payoff determination, the decision of the determined dictator is implemented. This
implies that a subject’s decision determines her own payoff and another subject’s payoff with a
probability of 1/2. Rol50 generates twice as many independent dictator observations relative to
N-N, using the same amount of subjects.
DeRo25 – Probabilistic Decision Selection and Role Uncertainty: This treatment combines
the features of Dec50 (probabilistic decision selection) and Rol50 (role uncertainty). First, all
subjects determine the allocation in two consecutive dictator games as in Dec50. To determine the
players’ payoffs, subjects are randomly assigned their actual player role with a probability of 1/2.
Consequently, there is the same number N of dictators and receivers. Dictators and receivers are
randomly matched, resulting in N dictator-receiver dyads. Then, one of the two decisions from
the determined dictator is chosen with a probability of 1/2 and paid out. The procedure implies
that a subject’s decision in one of the two dictator games determines her own payoff and another
subject’s payoff with a probability of 1/4. In contrast to N-N, this treatment generates twice as many
observations and requires only 1/2 of the subjects. It also permits within-subject comparisons.
7We chose exactly the same dictator-game decision twice in order to study a pure repetition effect. Choosing a
different task would have been arbitrary. As shown later, a good proportion of the subjects actually takes two different
decisions across the games.
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2.2 Experimental procedures
General procedures. The experiment was conducted at the Cologne Laboratory for Economic
Research (CLER), located at the University of Cologne. The lab has 32 cubicles, allowing us to
include 16 dictator-receiver dyads in the standard version of the dictator game, i.e., N=16. For each
treatment, the number of sessions and involved subjects depended on the treatment features (see
Table 1). We collected decisions from 32 dictators in each treatment. In total, 304 subjects (192
dictators) participated.8 Subjects were recruited via the online recruiting system ORSEE (Greiner,
2015) and participated only in one session. After subjects had arrived at the laboratory, they drew
a random code and were seated in separate and opaque cubicles. Subjects were not allowed to
communicate. In case of any question, they had to raise their hand so that the experimenter could
come and help. The experiment started after all subjects had read the instructions on paper, the
experimenter had publicly read through the instructions, and questions regarding the structure of
the experiment had been answered in private. The experiments were conducted on the computer,
using the experimental platform z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007), and lasted about one hour. After the
main experimental task, subjects were asked to fill in a list of questionnaires with items on their
understanding of the experiment, empirical and normative beliefs, social value orientation, personal
values, Big Five personality, willingness to make a donation, and sociodemographic background.
Concluding the session, subjects were compensated individually with a fixed amount of e4 for
showing up, along with the amount that they had earned in the experiment.9
Specific Controls. Due to the nature of the experiment, random treatment assignment was not
possible within experimental sessions. Therefore, we took specific care of the following factors in
order to keep the experimental conditions as constant as possible across dictator-game variants and
sessions: i) Schedule: The experimental sessions were scheduled on a Tuesday or Wednesday, between
9:00 a.m. and 12:15 p.m., during the students’ summer term. In the treatments with two sessions,
we placed one session on a Tuesday and the other one on a Wednesday in two different weeks.10
Further, we scheduled one session at 9 a.m. and one session at 11 a.m. Taken together, this ensured
no bridging days, balanced week days and daytime, and a short time span for conducting the entire
experiment.11 ii) Experimenter : To avoid experimenter effects (e.g., Roth et al., 1991; Zizzo, 2010),
the same experimenter conducted the experiment applying exactly the same experimental protocol.
Instructions were neutrally written, avoiding terms like “dictator”, “giving”, or “fair”, because loaded
instructions may alter dictator behavior (e.g., Burnham et al., 2000). iii) Sex: We strictly balanced
the sex of the participants, because women tend to participate more often than men in experiments
(e.g., Cleave et al., 2013) and typically transfer more than men in dictator games (e.g., Eckel and
Grossman, 1998). For this purpose, males and females were separately invited to the same session.
We ensured that 50% of the dictators were female by preparing different sets of cubicle codes for each
sex. iv) Age: Our aim was to restrict the student sample to participants who were born between 1990
and 1999, yielding a typical age span for the current student cohort, because age might have a positive
effect on generosity (e.g., Engel, 2011). v) Culture: To avoid variance in the subjects’ decisions due
to the subjects’ cultural background (e.g., Henrich et al., 2005; Chuah et al., 2007), we only invited
8For details on the recruited subjects’ characteristics, refer to Table 6 in subsection 3.3.
9In Appendix B, the different stages of the experiment are depicted.
10Dec50 took place only on a Tuesday. Pay50 (which was added later) was played within one week.
11Please refer to Appendix C for the session plan of the experiment.
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subjects who indicated German as their mother tongue, which was used as an indicator for the
subjects’ origin. vi) Experience: We restricted the subject pool to participants who had no previous
experience with dictator-game experiments. Moreover, we aimed to invite only subjects who had
not participated more than seven times in other experiments before.12 This procedure was chosen
to enroll subjects who had some experience with the situation and procedures typically applied in
laboratory experiments. On the other hand, extensive personal experiences may cause the subjects
to play interactive games in the lab as if they have some repetition, and the experimenter may have
little to moderate this phenomenon (for a similar argument, see Levitt and List, 2007; Matthey and
Regner, 2013, find that participation in previous experiments tends to increase the amount subjects
allocate to themselves in dictator games). vii) Major : We also limited the share of business and
economic students – the biggest group in our university’s laboratory subject pool and potentially
familiar with the dictator game and less cooperative (e.g., Frank et al., 1993). viii) Laboratory:
Finally, we would like to emphasize that our general laboratory setup (32 opaque cubicles, e4 show-
up fee) is comparable to the majority of laboratories in the German speaking countries (Germany,
Austria, Switzerland). An inquiry conducted prior to the experiment (we received 23 responses to 26
inquiries to the lab managers) yielded that, on average, laboratories are equipped with 26 cubicles
and pay an average show up fee of e4.20 to their subjects.
2.3 The impact of probabilistic incentives
Assuming self-regarding, purely money-maximizing preferences, dictator transfers would not differ
among the six dictator-game variants. Dictators would keep the entire endowment for themselves.
Further, according to the invariance hypothesis (Güth et al., 1982; Bolle, 1990), dictators would
make the same decision in each treatment, independently of how their decision converts into actual
payoffs when decision costs are small and anonymity is guaranteed (i.e., the dictator does not have
to care about her image). However, following Camerer (2003), Cox (2010), and Smith (2010), who
emphasize that dictator-game results are quite sensitive to procedural changes, and based on other
findings, we consider two arguments suggesting behavioral differences across treatments.
The probability of being pivotal. First, in his metastudy on giving behavior in dictator games,
Engel (2011) finds that the less a dictator is sure that her intended behavior becomes effective, i.e.,
determines the payoff of the receiver, the less she transfers to the receiver. In this case, generosity
is less likely to enhance the receiver’s welfare. Likewise, low transfers are less likely to hurt the
receiver (see also Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009). One possible explanation for this pattern can be
derived from the dictator’s social image concerns: the less effective the dictator’s behavior becomes,
the less she needs to care about her appearance in the eyes of the receiver. An inequity aversion
model (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) would make the same prediction, because a disutility from
advantageous inequality becomes less likely when the receiver’s payoff is affected only with some
probability smaller than one. Following these results, we expect dictator transfers to decrease, when
it becomes less likely that the receiver is affected by the dictator’s decision (see PR in Table 1).
Expected payoffs. Second, in their review articles, Camerer et al. (1999) and Engel (2011) show
that people are less generous when playing with higher stakes. Higher stakes are also found to reduce
12At some stage, we also had to invite more experienced subjects in order to fill the experimental sessions (see Table
6).
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transfers induced by presentation effects or image concerns. In our experiment, absolute stakes (the
endowment) are held constant. Yet, the likelihood that a dictator can actually affect her own payoff
decreases in most treatments relative to the reference treatment. According to the above results, if
the dictator’s expected payoff becomes smaller, her transfers will increase and she can expose (more)
socially desirable behavior at a lower cost (see PD in Table 1). An inequity aversion model would
predict, ceteris paribus, lower transfers, when the dictator can affect her own payoff only with some
probability, but for sure determines the receiver’s wealth.13
Predictions. To predict behavior for the different variants of the dictator game, we consider a
subject deciding in the role of a dictator at the moment of her decision.14 In the treatment N-N
(our reference treatment), the subject knows that her decision is for sure payoff-relevant for herself
and the matched receiver. In the treatment N-N/2, the dictator’s allocation decision becomes less
effective and affects a randomly regarded receiver only with a probability of 1/2. The impact on
her own payoff remains constant. Therefore, according to the first argument above, we expect
the dictators to transfer less in N-N/2 as compared to N-N. The Fehr-Schmidt model on inequity
aversion would predict the same tendency as the disutility from advantageous inequality becomes
less likely.15
In the treatments Pay50, Dec50, and Rol50, the dictator’s decision affects the payoff of a randomly
chosen receiver, but also her own payoff, only with a probability of 1/2 due to probabilistic payment
or decision selection, or role uncertainty. The dictator’s decision becomes less effective, but her own
stake also becomes relatively smaller compared to N-N.16 Here, the above arguments conflict: on the
one hand, transfers may increase, because presentation effects or image concerns may become more
prevalent, as they are less costly. On the other hand, transfers may decrease, because the dictators
need to care less about their appearance in the eyes of the receiver. When we assume that dictators
prefer to save money over spending money, i.e., that the first argument dominates the second one –
as long as a dictator has some stake (i.e., her decision influences her own payoff to some extent)17,
we expect lower transfers in Pay50, Dec50, and Rol50, respectively, relative to N-N.18 One argument
which supports this assumption is that people tend to be self-servingly biased (e.g., Loewenstein
et al., 1993), such that they care more for their own than for the payoff of other players. Fehr and
Schmidt (1999) make a similar assumption in their model on inequity aversion: A player’s disutility
from disadvantageous inequality is larger than her disutility if the player is better off than another
player.
13The case becomes more complicated when both the dictator’s and the receiver’s payoffs are probabilistic and
when the probablities differ. This is not the case in our experiment.
14For the treatments Rol50 and DeRo25, this implies that the subject will not necessarily be assigned the role of
the dictator for payoff determination afterwards.
15Generally, the model predicts a maximum transfer of x=5. The detailed calculations are shown in Appendix D.
16Here, we make the assumption that the source of randomization (either through payment, decision, or role
uncertainty) does not matter for the dictator. We will come back to the plausibility of this assumption in the
discussion section.
17This would not hold for a purely hypothetical decision. There, the probability of a dictator’s decision to become
payoff-relevant for either player drops to zero. The dictator has no stake at all. Hence, based only on the second
argument, hypothetical transfers would be driven by image concerns (towards the receiver and potentially also the
experimenter) and are therefore higher than in N-N.
18Engel (2011) also finds a significant negative effect of random pay if no study dummies are added to his meta-
regression (p. 591). The expectation of lower transfers in Rol50 is corroborated by the result that people tend to act
less pro-socially, when they are forced to take the role of the opposite player (e.g., Burks et al., 2003). By contrast,
Iriberri and Rey-Biel (2011), find that pro-social behavior in a dictator game increases with role uncertainty.
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For the treatment DeRo25, the same relation holds regarding the comparison with N-N and relative
to Pay50, Dec50, and Rol50, respectively, because in DeRo25 a dictator affects her own payoff
and the payoff of a randomly chosen receiver only with a probability of 1/4. The Fehr-Schmidt
model would also partly predict lower transfers in Pay50, Dec50, and Rol50, as well as in DeRo25,
respectively, relative to N-N. For β - parameters 0 and 0.25, the model predicts treatment-invariant
transfers of x=0. For β=0.6, dictator transfers are equal to x=5 in the reference treatment N-N,
and x=0 in the other treatments.19
3 Results
We first analyze dictator generosity across the different treatments and study the specific impact of
unbalanced matching, probabilisitic payment or decision selection, and role uncertainty relative to
the reference treatment.
3.1 Generosity
We show a characterization of the dictator transfers in each treatment in Table 2.20 Table 3 de-
picts the results from different statistical tests for each treatment’s comparison with the reference
treatment N-N.
Comparing N-N (1.69) with N-N/2 (2.06), Pay50 (1.47), and Dec50 (1.63, 1.81)21, respectively,
we find no evidence that dictator transfers significantly differ. Detected effect sizes are rather low.
Conversely, if we contrast dictator transfers from the reference treatment with Rol50 (2.81) and
DeRo25 (2.63, 2.75)22, we find them to be significantly higher, but not differently distributed.
Effect sizes range from moderate to strong.
Next, we pool our data for regression analyses. In Table 4, we first assess whether the probability
of a dictator’s decision to be payoff-relevant for herself (PD) or for the receiver (PR) systematically
affects transfers. Model 1 shows that the degree of how much a dictator’s decision can actually
convert into her own payoff has no significant predictive power. Model 2 shows a weakly significant,
but also very small and not robust (model 3) negative impact of the likelihood how much a dictator’s
decision translates into the receiver’s payoff (cf. Engel, 2011). Pooled regressions, where treatment
dummies predict transfers (models 4 and 5), replicate our non-parametric findings on transfers and
also convey that PD and PR do not systematically influence dictator transfers.
19β=0, 0.25, and 0.6 are parameter values which are typically found in populations (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), but
see also Blanco et al. (2011) for lower values. Lower values would predict no treatment differences.
20Figure 1 in Appendix E shows the distribution of transfers for each treatment.
2134.37% of the dictators made a different transfer in the second game. First and second transfers are very similar
in D50 (p=0.271, Fisher-Pitman permutation test for paired replicates, henceforth: FPP).
2240.62% of the dictators made a different transfer in the second game. First and second transfers are very similar
in DeRo25 (p=0.531, FPP).
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Table 2: Transfers across Treatments
Treatment No. of Decisions AV SD Med Mode Min Max 0 ≥5
N-N 1 1.69 1.97 1 0 0 5 0.47 0.16
N-N/2 1 2.06 2.11 1.5 0 0 7 0.41 0.16
Pay50 1 1.47 1.83 0.5 0 0 5 0.50 0.13
Dec50 1 1.63 1.84 1 0 0 5 0.41 0.16
2 1.81 1.82 1 0 0 5 0.31 0.16
Rol50 1 2.81 2.21 4 0 0 7 0.31 0.28
DeRo25 1 2.63 2.34 3 0 0 10 0.28 0.22
2 2.75 2.46 3 0 0 10 0.28 0.22
All 2.19 2.13 2 0 0 10 0.34 0.18
Notes. AV (SD, Med, Min, Max) denotes Average, Standard deviation, Minimum, Maximum of the transfers.
0 (≥5) denotes the relative frequency of transfers x=0 (x ≥ 5).
Table 3: Statistical Tests
Statistical Test FPT t-test EST Cohen’s d 95% CI
Unbalanced matching
N-N vs. N-N/2 0.498 0.466 0.662 0.184 -1.396, 0.646
Probabilistic payment
N-N vs. Pay50 0.695 0.648 0.890 0.115 -0.732, 1.170
Probabilistic decision selection
N-N vs. Dec50 : Decision 1 0.952 0.896 0.701 0.033 -0.892, 1.017
N-N vs. Dec50 : Decision 2 0.844 0.793 0.499 0.066 -1.074, 0.824
N-N vs. Dec50 : AV (1,2) 0.973 0.947 0.483 0.017 -0.973, 0.911
Role uncertainty
N-N vs. Rol50 0.042 0.036 0.166 0.537 -2.171, -0.079
Probabilistic payment & role uncertainty
N-N vs. DeRo25 : Decision 1 0.098 0.088 0.388 0.433 -2.019, 0.144
N-N vs. DeRo25 : Decision 2 0.071 0.062 0.409 0.476 -2.177, 0.053
N-N vs. DeRo25 : AV (1,2) 0.076 0.071 0.389 0.459 -2.089, 0.089
Notes. The table shows the results from statistical tests for the impact of unbalanced matching, probabilistic
payment or decision, and role uncertainty. FPT (t-test) depicts the p-values from a Fisher-Pitman permu-
tation tests for two independent samples (independent two-sample t-test). EST shows the p-values from an
Epps-Singleton two-sample test. Cohen’s d displays the effect size for the difference in means between two
treatments. 95% CI provides the 95% confidence interval for the difference in means from the t-test.
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Table 4: Pooled Regression Analysis on the Effects of Randomization
Transfer (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PD -0.013
(0.009)
-0.004
(0.013)
PR -0.019*
(0.011)
-0.015
(0.016)
N-N/2 0.578
(0.836)
0.613
(0.785
Pay50 -0.341
(0.844)
0.302
(0.835)
Dec50 0.470
(0.760)
0.503
(0.704)
Rol50 1.592*
(0.809)
2.394***
(0.777)
DeRo25 1.572*
(0.810)
1.488*
(0.829)
Female 0.864*
(0.489)
Age -0.124**
(0.057)
German 0.375
(0.716)
Experience -0.044
(0.041)
Business/Economics -0.969*
(0.526)
Constant 2.142***
(0.571)
2.355***
(0.623)
2.399***
(0.634)
0.690
(0.615)
3.132*
(1.673)
Observations 192 192 192 192 186
Prob > F 0.131 0.084 0.211 0.081 0.000
R2 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.014 0.038
Notes. Coefficients from left-cencored tobit regression analyses. The reference category in models
(4) and (5) is N-N. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. Significance levels: ∗∗∗ p<0.01,
∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1.
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3.2 Validity
To asses the validity of the different dictator-game variants further, we relate exposed dictator gen-
erosity to three alternative individual difference measures of pro-sociality: social value orientation
(SVO), personal values, and a naturally occurring decision situation on charitable giving, which cre-
ates a – presumably commonly accepted – positive externality outside the laboratory (this approach
is similar to Benz and Meier, 2008). Beyond that, we examine the association between subjects’
generosity and the Big Five personality factors across dictator-game variants.
Social value orientation. In the incentivized SVO slider measure (Murphy and Ackermann, 2014),
subjects repeatedly choose between different own/other payoff allocations. The decisions resemble
repeated dictator-game decisions. From the respondents’ aggregated decisions, a SVO angle can be
calculated. A higher angle indicates a greater concern for the welfare of others. We expected the
angle to be positively correlated with dictator transfers.23
Personal values. In the non-incentivized Personal Values Questionnaire (Schwartz et al., 2012),
subjects respond to questions on how similar they consider themselves to a described person. From
their responses, the importance of ten basic values is derived for each individual (Schwartz, 1992).
Among the basic values, we expect the values along the dimensions of Self-Transcendence (consisting
of Benevolence and Universalism and mapping the ability to transcend one’s own interests for the
sake of others) and the Self-Enhancement (consisting of Power and Achievement and mapping the
importance of one’s will to pursue one’s own interests) to be positively (negatively) correlated with
the dictators’ generosity.24 It was important for us to include a non-incentivized measure of pro-
sociality, because incentivized measures are potentially susceptible to spillover effects, i.e., subjects
might try to balance behaviors across decisions (hedging or moral balancing effects, e.g., Merritt
et al., 2010).
SVO and personal values are widely used in experimental economics and social psychology and have
been shown to explain individual differences in dictator-game giving (e.g., Cornelissen et al., 2011;
Lönnqvist et al., 2013). These two measures were elicited after the main experimental task. The
application of both measures was balanced in each experimental session, i.e., half of the subjects
first completed the SVO measure and half of the subjects started with the values questionnaire.
Donation. To make an external donation, we provided the subjects at the very end of the experi-
ment with the opportunity to make a donation from their show-up fee in order to support a medical
drug program against Malaria in Kenia run by Unicef.25 Subjects could donate any amount between
0 and 400 Cents (complete show-up fee). In the description of the donation call, we explicitly con-
veyed that the donated money would actually be transferred to Unicef and that the subjects could
check the transfer receipt afterward.26 We expected the donation to be positively correlated with
dictator transfers (Barr et al., 2010; Franzen and Pointner, 2013).
23It has to be noted here that this well-established measure utilizes probabilistic payment and role uncertainty.
First, all subjects take several distribution decisions. For payoff determination, subjects are randomly assigned the
role of a dictator or a receiver. Dictators and receivers are randomly matched in pairs. In each pair, one dictator
decision is randomly chosen and determines the pair’s payoff.
24Please refer to Appendix F for the complete list and a short description of the ten basic values.
25Detailed information on the program can be found at https://www.unicef.org/health/index_malaria.html.
26The original donation call and the transfer receipts are displayed in Appendix G. The receipt also includes the
donations from the receivers (see Figure 2).
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Table 5: Dictator Transfers and Alternative Measures of Generosity and Personality
Measure/Treatment N-N N-N/2 Pay50 Dec50 Rol50 DeRo25
Social Value Orientation 0.669*** 0.670*** 0.608*** 0.723*** 0.272 0.573***
Self-Transcendence Values 0.424** 0.421** 0.066 0.256 0.239 -0.104
Self-Enhancement -0.333* -0.056 -0.143 -0.343** 0.137 0.130
Donation 0.454*** 0.429** 0.093 0.319* 0.291 0.116
Agreeableness 0.508*** 0.538*** 0.067 0.037 0.345* 0.144
Neuroticism -0.263 0.225 0.053 0.002 0.321* 0.029
Extraversion 0.004 0.105 -0.043 0.038 -0.206 0.089
Openness 0.284 0.290 -0.092 -0.255 0.085 -0.181
Conscientiousness -0.282 0.057 -0.056 0.129 -0.162 -0.033
Notes. Spearman correlation coefficients. In D50 and DeRo25, correlations are calculated with dictators’ average
transfers. Significance levels: ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1.
Big Five personality. Subjects’ personality profiles were gathered after the SVO and values
questionnaires using a 60-item personality measure (Konstabel et al., 2012) that captures the five
personality factors Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness con-
ceptualized in the Five-Factor Model (Costa Jr and McCrae, 1992). Based on previous studies on
the relationship between pro-social behavior and personality (e.g., Ben-Ner et al., 2008; Hilbig et al.,
2014; Zhao and Smillie, 2015), we expected Agreeableness – which describes a person as kind, sym-
pathetic, cooperative, warm, and considerate – to be positively associated with generosity.
Zero-order correlations are displayed in Table 5.27 For the SVO angle, we find significant moderate
to high positive correlations with dictator transfer in N-N, N-N/2, Pay50, and Dec50. In DoRe25,
the correlation is positive and moderate. In Rol50, we do not find a positive correlation between the
SVO angle and dictator transfers. Regarding values, in N-N, N-N/2, and partly Dec50, we observe
the expected positive (negative) correlations between dictator transfers and Self-Transcendence (Self-
Enhancement) values. In Pay50, Rol50 and DeRo25, Self-Transcendence values show no significant
correlations with the dictators’ generosity. Looking at the donations, we find significant moderate
positive correlations in the treatments N-N, N-N/2, and Dec50. In Pay50, Rol50, and DeRo25,
dictator transfers are not significantly correlated with the amount donated to Unicef. The internal
factor reliabilities for the five personality factors are 0.859 (Neuroticism), 0.847 (Extraversion), 0.781
(Openness), 0.764 (Agreeableness), and 0.817 (Conscientiousness). Table 5 shows that only in the
treatments N-N and N-N/2, we find the expected strong association of transferred amounts and
Agreeableness. Finally, when we correlate pairwise Self-Transcendence Values, SVO angle, donation,
and Agreeableness, respectively, we find them to be significantly correlated (see Table 12 in Appendix
H). Correlation coefficients range from moderate to high. These results suggest that those variables
measure kindred constructs and can be applied as additional controls.
27For the treatments Dec50 and DoRe25, we use the dictators’ average transfer – taken from their first and second
dictator-game decision – for the correlations. Separate correlations yield very similar results.
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3.3 Controls
As a last step, we run additional controls. We look at potential time effects, the characteristics of
the recruited subjects, and how they perceived the decision situation. We also check if the different
treatments evoke different social norms – dictator beliefs about what other dictators do and what
the receivers expect them to do.
Time effects. The day (Tuesday is coded 1) and the daytime (9 a.m. is coded 1) of the experimental
sessions were not significantly correlated with dictator transfers.28
Subjects’ characteristics. Table 2 provides an overview on the characteristics of the recruited
subjects deciding as dictators. The table conveys that we managed to select rather similar subjects
into the different treatments. Sex (50% females) and age (average = 23.30 years) of the dictators
is well-balanced. Further, a high percentage (89.06%) of the subjects was born in Germany (as
described above, all invited subjects had previously indicated German as their mother tongue; this
we took as a proxy for their nationality when we recruited them). Subjects had moderate experience
(on average, 5.64 participations) with previous experiments. Past dictator-game experience was ruled
out by the recruiting software. A share of 69.27% of the subjects majored in a discipline different
from business or economics. From our selection criteria, sex (r=0.177, p=0.014, PBC), experience
with previous experiments (ρ=-0.175, p=0.017, Spearman rank correlation, henceforth: SRC ), and
studying business or economics (r=-0.144, p=0.045, PBC) show a significant zero-order correlation
with the (average) dictator transfer.29 In model 5 of Table 4, we display the results from a multiple
regression analysis, where we predict dictator generosity depending on a treatment dummy and the
described subjects’ characteristics. The results suggest that when we add multiple controls, women
tend to make higher transfers than men and that age and being a business/economics student is
significantly negatively associated with transfers.30
Comprehension questions. To assess whether the dictators had correctly understood the decisive
features of our treatments, we asked them after the main experimental task to indicate how likely it
is that their decisions determine their own payoff and the payoff from a randomly regarded receiver
(cf. PD and PR in Table 1).31 Overall, the dictators’ answers suggest that they had understood how
their decisions affect their own and the receiver’s payoff.32
Empirical and normative expectations. To examine whether the dictators perceive the decision
situation differently depending on which dictator-game variant is played, we asked them to state two
beliefs after the main experimental task. First, we asked them to estimate the average transfer of
the other subjects deciding in the dictator role. Second, we asked them to state their second-order
belief on what they should transfer from the perspective of the receivers (see, e.g., Bicchieri, 2006).33
28Day: r=-0.045, p=0.539; daytime: r=0.040, p=0.583, Point biserial correlations (henceforth: PBC).
29The other correlations are: Age: ρ=-0.094, p=0.193, SRC; Born in Germany: r=0.032, p=0.658, PBC.
30The coefficient for Age contrasts with previous results (e.g., Engel, 2011). Yet, the coefficient is very small and
the students are still very young in our sample due to the limitied age span. Our finding for females and studying
business or economics corroborates the findings from Eckel and Grossman (1998) and Frank et al. (1993).
31These probabilities are determined by the likelihood (depending on the treatment) that a subject – taking the
decision as a dictator – is actually matched with a receiver, and is actually assigned the role of the dictator (receiver),
and that a specific decision is actually chosen for payment.
32Not all subjects provided correct answers. Since the structure of the games is simple and was carefully explained
by the experimenter, our conjecture is that some subjects made mistakes in their explicit calculations or did not fully
understand the questions about the game. Support for this conjecture comes from the treatment N-N, which is the
simplest of all. Even there, not all subjects provided the correct answers.
33To limit the amount of incentivized tasks, we chose not to reward dictators for accuracy of expectations. The
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Table 6: Dictators’ Characteristics, Comprehension Questions, and Expectations
Treatment Fem Age (SD) Ger Exp Maj PD PR BE BN
N-N 0.50 23.00 (2.87) 0.94 5.03 0.84 1.00 (0.90) 1.00 (0.76) 2.13 4.44
N-N/2 0.50 23.00 (3.32) 0.75 5.06 0.84 1.00 (0.90) 0.75 (0.74) 2.06 3.75
Pay50 0.50 23.44 (3.71) 0.96 7.00 0.44 0.50 (0.56) 0.50 (0.56) 2.09 3.91
Dec50 0.50 23.03 (3.29) 0.94 5.12 0.81 0.50 (0.64) 0.50 (0.63) 1.59 4.28
Rol50 0.50 24.28 (7.00) 0.84 5.63 0.50 0.50 (0.61) 0.50 (0.64) 3.00 4.16
DeRo25 0.50 23.06 (2.49) 0.97 11.65 0.72 0.25 (0.30) 0.25 (0.32) 3.00 4.34
Total: 0.50 23.30 (4.04) 0.89 5.64 0.74
Notes. Fem (Age, SD, Ger, Exp, Maj) denotes the share of females (average age, the standard deviation of dictators’ age,
the share of dictators born in Germany, the number of previous participations in experiments, and the share of dictators
who have a different major subject than Business Administration or Economics). PD (PR) denotes the dictators’ median
(average) estimation of the probability for a dictator’s decision to be payoff-relevant for the respective dictator in a specific
dictator game (the dictators’ median (average) estimation of the probability for a dictator’s decision to be payoff-relevant
for a randomly regarded receiver in a specific dictator game). BE (BN ) denotes the dictators’ empirical expectation
regarding the behavior of the other dictators (the dictators’ expectation regarding what they think the receivers expect
them to transfer). In the treatment Rol50, one subject was 58 years old. When we exclude this subject from the average
age calculation, the average age is 23.19 (SD=3.40). In the treatment DeRo25, two subjects had participated in – curiously
enough – 93 previous experiments. When we exclude these subjects from the average participation calculation, the average
experience in previous experiments is 6.03.
Regarding the empirical expectations, we find no evidence that the dictators have different beliefs in
N-N as compared to N-N/2, Pay50, andDec50.34 In the treatments Rol50 andDeRo25, the dictators
expect the other dictators to transfer significantly more than in N-N, what the other dictators also
actually do (p=0.024; p=0.014, FPT) (see BE in Table 6). The normative expectations are very
similar across the treatments. This conveys that dictators’ normative perception of the dictator-
game variants is comparable across treatments. Only in N-N/2, do the dictators believe that they
should transfer somewhat less as compared to N-N (p=0.079, FPT) (see BN in Table 6).35
4 Discussion
We now discuss our findings from the different dictator-game variants with regard to average trans-
fers, their relation to the complementary measures of generosity, and previous findings from the
literature. As we have shown, the degree of how much a dictator’s decision can actually convert into
both players’ payoffs has no robust significant impact on transfers. We will therefore examine how
the source of randomization affects behavior in order to assess the suitability of each dictator-game
variant as a reasonable complement to the standard version of the dictator game.
Reference treatment. In N-N, subjects transfer slightly less to the receivers (16.9%) as compared
to what Engel (2011) reports on average generosity in student samples (24.7%). This might be an
artefact of the methodological heterogeneity in the dictator games we analyze, respectively, or of the
University of Cologne’s subject pool (for a comparable result, see Camerer, 2003). Most importantly,
evidence about whether payment increases accuracy or not is not conclusive (e.g., Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker, 2008;
Gächter and Renner, 2010).
34p=0.927; p=0.996, p=0.129, Fisher-Pitman permutation test for two independent samples, henceforth: FPT.
35The other comparisons yield: N-N vs. Pay50 (Dec50, Rol50, DeRo25 ): p=0.210 (p=0.796, p=0.515, p=0.873),
FPT.
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generosity in N-N shows the expected associations with dictators’ social value orientation, personal
values, inclination to make a donation, and personality (cf. Cornelissen et al., 2011; Lönnqvist et al.,
2013; Benz and Meier, 2008; Hilbig et al., 2014). In this respect, N-N provides the most convincing
results such that the experimenters can be assured that they actually measure what they intend to
measure.
Unbalanced Matching. In N-N/2, we find no evidence that the dictators behave differently as
compared to our reference treatment. The results are less pronounced with regard to their validity
although the correlations with alternative measures of generosity are acceptable. The dictators seem
not to strongly react towards a decrease in the effectivity of their choice concerning the payoff of the
receiver. If there are plausible arguments for using unbalanced dictator-receiver groups in special
cases, unbalanced matching may be a feasible alternative in order to gather necessary data (e.g.,
Houser and Schunk, 2009; see also Walkowitz, 2018, for a recent study with prison inmates).
With regard to transparency about the applied matching procedure, our results suggest that unbal-
anced matching can be made transparent in order to avoid notions of deception.36 We also want to
emphasize that N-N/2 is only one possible variant for testing the effects of involving fewer receivers.
In principle, only two receivers are needed to meet the requirement of a fully “random” matching of
dictators and receivers. This variant would be the most conservative and efficient test for studying
the impact of involving fewer receivers than dictators. We decided to involve twice as many dictators
than receivers to maintain comparable incentives across our treatments. An interesting question for
future research is whether our finding also holds when the number of receivers is further reduced.
Probabilistic payment. The results from Pay50 provide an illustrative case for the benefits of
not only considering dictators’ average transfers, but also their underlying motivations. On the one
hand, we find no evidence that the transfers are significantly different from the reference treatment.
On the other hand, we find the transfers in Pay50 to expose insufficient associations with alternative
measures of generosity. Therefore, if researchers are interested in absolute average levels of generosity
in the subject pool, paying only some subjects might be feasible. Yet, when generosity is tested
and quantified against other competing motives, random payment might be misleading. Moreover,
if the researchers are interested in underlying motivations, or when the dictator game adds an
individual control for altruistic preferences to other experimental data, associations between the
exposed behaviors might be biased when subjects are paid randomly.
Our results from Pay50 differ from Sefton (1992) – not with regard to the overall conclusion about the
appropriatenes of random payment, but with regard to average behavior. In his experiment, dictators
are significantly more generous in relation to the control treatment without random payment, when
only 25% of the subjects are paid. The differences among his and our results might be due to the fact
that, in our study, we pay more subjects (50% instead of 25%; this is closer to the reference treatment)
and we have higher stakes (e10 to be split instead of $5; people are less generous when playing with
higher stakes; see, e.g., Camerer et al., 1999, and Engel, 2011). Further, as Table 6 shows, selected
subjects in Pay50 have participated in more experiments (7 vs. 5.03 average participations) and
the proportion of non-business/economics students is lower (44% vs. 84%). The multiple regression
analysis in Table 4 shows that being a business/economics student indeed negatively correlates with
36A discussion of the question whether not making it transparent is actually deceptive is beyond the scope of this
paper.
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the dictators’ generosity in the whole study sample. Yet, we find no such significant correlation for
the Pay50 sub-sample (ρ=-0.117, p=0.523, SRC). The same holds for previous experience, which is
not significantly correlated with generosity in Pay50 (ρ=-0.286, p=0.119, SRC). Generally, if major
subject and experience actually affected the subjects’ preferences, the strength of the correlations
with complementary measures of generosity should not be affected, because the subjects’ preferences
are only “shifted”. This is not the case in Pay50, though.
Probabilistic decision selection. Using the data of Dec50 and a regression analysis (see Table
4), we can infer that the mere fact that a dictator takes a second, similarly structured, decision does
not significantly influence her behavior. While a good proportion of the dictators takes a different
decision in the second dictator game, we do not find broad differences with regard to the averages
and the validity of the exposed behaviors in Dec50 relative to our reference treatment. Like in
N-N/2, the results are less strong, though, and we find no expected association with Agreeableness.
The results from Dec50 suggest that a probabilisitc payoff, caused by a randomization of the payoff-
relevant tasks, does not sufficiently change dictator behavior. This corroborates previous results on
how the elicitation and payment of multiple choices (e.g., via the strategy method) – without role
uncertainty – influence behavior (Brandts and Charness, 2000; Engel, 2011; Laury, 2005; Azrieli
et al., 2018).
Role uncertainty. In the treatment Rol50, the dictators transfer significantly higher amounts
to the receivers as compared to the reference treatment. The same tendency can be observed in
the treatment DeRo25, which combines a probabilistic decision selection with role uncertainty (see
Iriberri and Rey-Biel, 2011, for a similar finding). Hence, in DeRo25, role uncertainty seems to
dominate the effect of a randomly selected decision for payoff. Inflated generosity may become an
issue when it is tested against other motives (see, however, Engelmann and Strobel, 2004, who state
that – according to their data – role uncertainty does not change the relative importance of inequality
aversion, efficiency, and maximin preferences, p. 867). Most importantly, the subjects’ transfers in
Rol50 and DeRo25 do not expose the expected correlations with other individual difference measures
of generosity. Picking up the above quote from Iriberri and Rey-Biel (2011), dictator games with
role uncertainty indeed seem to identify different motives behind observed non-selfish behavior.
Therefore, when the dictator game adds a control for altruistic preferences to other experimental
data, associations between the experimental tasks might be biased. This is of specific interest,
because in this case experimenters typically want to elicit a data point from all participants – and
a dictator game with role uncertainty offers a very convenient way for doing so, as the receivers are
initially not needed.
In Rol50, the recruited subjects are somewhat older relative to the reference treatment (due to an
outlier) and the amount of students majoring in business or economics is higher (see Table 6). Both
facts have not driven the transfers upwards, because the corresponding correlation coefficents are
not significant, very small, and partly even negative in Rol50.37 The same holds for the potential
impact of more experienced subjects in DeRo25 (see Table 2).38 As we have also shown in a multiple
regression, experience has no impact, and age and major subject have a negative impact on dicator
transfers, generally speaking. Therefore, we do not believe that these variables have pushed the
37Age: ρ=0.009, p=0.962, SRC; Major: r=-0.192 , p=0.292, PBC.
38Experience: ρ=-0.062, p=0.751, SRC.
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transfers in Rol50 or DeRo25 upwards.
Our analyses also convey the idea that dictators in Rol50 and DeRo25 have higher empirical beliefs
concerning the transfers of the other dictators relative to N-N and Dec50.39 We also find that
empirical expectations and transfers are highly correlated in all treatments (all ρ>0.354, p<0.047,
SRC). Hence, dictator transfers in Rol50 and DeRo25 relate to what the dictators believe about
the behavior of the other dictators. Contrary to the other treatments, in Rol50 and DeRo25, the
behavior of other subjects is potentially payoff-relevant for a subject. Although not strategically
relevant, there is an inter-player dependence and the players may be forced to put themselves
into the shoes of another player and into either player role. Therefore, transfers might reflect a
notion of empathy or reciprocity toward other players who might affect a subject’s payoff (Batson
et al., 1988). The results from our correlational analysis above, however, speak against this last
interpretation. Alternatively, transfers might entail an element of “wishful” or “fearful” thinking40:
because subjects face the threat of ending up as receivers, they evaluate the game outcomes from the
receiver’s perspective. They make a generous transfer and hope that they will be matched with an
equally-minded dictator in case they are actually assigned the receiver role. Testing and disentagling
these alternative explanations is an interesting path for future work.
Another important aspect for future methodological work relates to the fact that the applied (stan-
dard) measure for social value orientation also comprises uncertainty about the decision-maker’s
actual role. Nevertheless, individual SVO angles are highly positively correlated with dictator gen-
erosity in almost all treatments and with the other social preference indicators. Based on our data,
but also suporting a line of other studies which use the technique of combining random decision
payment and role uncertainty (e.g., Charness and Rabin, 2002), our conjecture, as yet to be verified,
is that, if experimental subjects take sufficient decisions under role uncertainty, the distorting effect
of role uncertainty will become smaller.
As a final remark, we intended to link our results to the experimental studies cited in the introduc-
tion, which use different forms of randomization. After a careful reading, we realized that this is an
impossible endeavor for at least three reasons: First, dictator transfers in these studies depend on
many treatment interventions that render comparisons very difficult. Second, different randomiza-
tion techniques are combined. Third, average generosity in some cases cannot be calculated based
on the information provided in the papers. However, our attempt underlines the need for a cohesive
study for a better understanding of the impact of the different randomiziation procedures creating
probabilistic incentives, but also that further evidence which warrants our findings is needed. For
future research, we, therefore, also suggest to focus on other commonly used and more complex
games. Even in a our simple setup without strategic interaction, we can detect significant influ-
ences of randomization-based probabilistic incentives. Similar effects might occur and blur the link
between preferences and behavior when the players are strategically connected (e.g., Blanco et al.,
2011; Burks et al., 2003).
39As shown, normative expectations do not significantly differ across these treatments.
40In Rol50, transfers are weakly associated with the personality factor Neuroticism (see Table 5).
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Appendix
Appendix A: Experimental Instructions (in German [English])
Preamble (in all treatments)
Instruktionen für das Experiment
Sie nehmen nun an einem wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Entscheidungsexperiment teil. Bitte lesen Sie
sich die Instruktionen für das Experiment sorgfältig durch. Für die gesamte Dauer des Experiments
ist es sehr wichtig, dass Sie nicht mit anderen Experimentsteilnehmern sprechen. Wenn Sie etwas
nicht verstehen sollten, schauen Sie bitte noch einmal in diese Instruktionen. Falls Sie dann noch
Fragen haben, geben Sie uns bitte ein Handzeichen. Wir werden dann zu Ihnen an die Kabinen
kommen und Ihre Fragen persönlich beantworten.
Für Ihr Erscheinen erhalten Sie eine Aufwandsentschädigung in Höhe von 4 €. Im Verlauf des Exper-
iments können Sie Geld hinzuverdienen. Die Höhe Ihres Verdienstes hängt von Ihren Entscheidungen
oder von den Entscheidungen anderer Teilnehmer ab. Sie erfahren zu keinem Zeitpunkt den Na-
men der anderen Teilnehmer. Genauso erfahren die anderen Entscheider zu keinem Zeitpunkt Ihre
Identität.
Alle Daten und Antworten werden anonym ausgewertet. Um Anonymität zu gewährleisten, haben
Sie eine persönliche Kabinennummer gezogen.
Am Ende des Experiments bitten wir Sie, noch ein paar Fragen zu beantworten
Instructions for the experiment.
You are now taking part in an economic decision experiment. Please read the following instructions
for the experiment carefully. Throughout the entire experiment it is very important that you do
not talk to any of the other participants. In case you do not understand something, please read the
corresponding instructions again. If you then still have questions, please raise your hand. We will
come to your cubicle and answer your questions personally. For showing up, you will receive a fixed
amount of 4 €. In this experiment, you can earn additional money. The amount of money you can
earn during the experiment depends on your decisions or on the decisions of other participants.
You are at no point in time informed about the names of the other participants. Likewise, the other
participants do not get to know your identity at any point in time. All data and answers will be
analyzed anonymously. In order to assure anonymity, you have drawn a personal cubicle number.
After the experiment, we will ask you to answer some questions.
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Description of the dictator game (in all treatments)
Experimentsbeschreibung
In diesem Experiment gibt es zwei mögliche Rollen, die Sie als Teilnehmer potentiell haben können:
Person A und Person B. Person A trifft eine für Person A und Person B auszahlungsrelevante
Entscheidung. Person A erhält eine Anfangsausstattung in Höhe von 10 €.
Person A hat nun die Möglichkeit, einen beliebigen Teil dieser Anfangsausstattung an Person B zu
transferieren. Dabei kann Person A nur ganzzahlige Beträge transferieren, d.h. Person A kann nur
eine Zahl aus der Menge {0, 1, 2, 3, . . . , 10} wählen.
Person B erhält keine Anfangsausstattung und trifft keine Entscheidung.
Die Auszahlung von Person A bestimmt sich wie folgt:
+ Anfangsausstattung von Person A
- dem von Person A an Person B transferierten Betrag
= Auszahlung von Person A
Die Auszahlung von Person B bestimmt sich wie folgt:
+ der von Person A an Person B transferierte Betrag
= Auszahlung von Person B
Description of the experiment
In this experiment, there are two roles that you can potentially have as a participant: Person A
and Person B. Person A takes a decision which is payoff-relevant for Person A and Person B.
Person A receives an endowment of e10. Person A can transfer any part of the endowment to
Person B. Person A can only transfer integer amounts, i.e., Person A can only choose numbers
from {0, 1, 2, 3, . . . , 10}. Person B receives no endowment and makes no decision. The payoffs
are calculated as follows: The payoff of Person A is determined by: + Endowment of Person A -
Transfer from Person A to Person B = Payoff of Person A. The payoff of Person B is determined
by: + Transfer from Person A to Person B = Payoff of Person B.
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Treatment N-N (Reference Treatment)
Bitte beachten Sie:
Jedem Teilnehmer wird zunächst zufällig die Rolle von Person A oder die Rolle von Person B
zugeordnet.
Nach der Zuordnung hat genau die Hälfte der Teilnehmer die Rolle von Person A. Die andere Hälfte
der Teilnehmer hat die Rolle von Person B.
Jeder Person A wird zufällig eine Person B zugeordnet.
Person A trifft die beschriebene Entscheidung einmal.
Die Auszahlung einer Person A hängt von ihrer eigenen Entscheidung ab.
Die Auszahlung einer Person B hängt jeweils von der Entscheidung von Person A innerhalb einer
Zuordnung ab.
Please note: Every participant is first randomly assigned the role of Person A or the role of Person
B. After the assignment, exactly half of the participants have the role of Person A. The other half
of the participants have the role of Person B. Every Person A is randomly matched with a Person
B. Person A makes the described decision once. The payoff of a Person A depends on her own
decision. The payoff of a Person B depends on the decision of Person A within a matching group,
respectively.
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Treatment N-N/2 (Unbalanced Matching)
Bitte beachten Sie:
Jedem Teilnehmer wird zunächst zufällig die Rolle von Person A oder die Rolle von Person B
zugeordnet.
Nach der Zuordnung haben genau 2/3 der Teilnehmer die Rolle von Person A. 1/3 der Teilnehmer
hat die Rolle von Person B.
Jeder Person A wird zufällig mit einer Wahrscheinlichkeit von 50% eine Person B zugeordnet.
Person A trifft die beschriebene Entscheidung einmal.
Die Auszahlung einer Person A hängt von ihrer eigenen Entscheidung ab. Dies gilt auch für den
Fall, wenn Person A keine Person B tatsächlich zugeordnet wurde.
Die Auszahlung einer Person B hängt jeweils von der Entscheidung von Person A innerhalb einer
Zuordnung ab.
Please note: Every participant is first randomly assigned the role of Person A or the role of Person
B. After the assignment, exactly 2/3 of the participants have the role of Person A. 1/3 of the
participants have the role of Person B. Every Person A is randomly matched, with a probability
of 50%, with a Person B. Person A makes the described decision once. The payoff of a Person A
depends on her own decision. This also holds if Person A is not actually matched with a Person B.
The payoff of a Person B depends on the decision of Person A within a matching group, respectively.
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Treatment Pay50 (Probabilistic Payment)
Bitte beachten Sie:
Jedem Teilnehmer wird zunächst zufällig die Rolle von Person A oder die Rolle von Person B
zugeordnet.
Nach der Zuordnung hat genau die Hälfte der Teilnehmer die Rolle von Person A. Die andere Hälfte
der Teilnehmer hat die Rolle von Person B.
Jeder Person A wird zufällig eine Person B zugeordnet.
Person A trifft die beschriebene Entscheidung einmal.
Nach der Entscheidung von Person A werden 50% der Zuordnungen von Person A und Person B
zufällig ausgewählt. Diese werden dann tatsächlich, jeweils in Abhängigkeit von der Entscheidung
von Person A innerhalb einer Zuordnung, ausgezahlt. Die anderen 50% der Zuordnungen werden
nicht tatsächlich ausgezahlt.
Die tatsächliche Auszahlung einer Person A hängt somit von ihrer eigenen Entscheidung ab und
davon, ob ihre Zuordnung für die Auszahlung zufällig ausgewählt wurde.
Die tatsächliche Auszahlung einer Person B hängt jeweils von der Entscheidung von Person A in-
nerhalb einer Zuordnung ab, und davon, ob ihre Zuordnung für die Auszahlung zufällig ausgewählt
wurde.
Please note: Every participant is first randomly assigned the role of Person A or the role of Person
B. After the assignment, exactly half of the participants have the role of Person A. The other
half of the participants have the role of Person B. Every Person A is randomly matched with a
Person B. Person A makes the described decision once. The payoff of a Person A depends on her
own decision. The payoff of a Person B depends on the decision of Person A within a matching
group, respectively. After the decision of Person A, 50% of the Person A-Person B matching
groups are randomly chosen. They are actually paid out, depending on the decision of Person A
within a matching group, respectively. The other 50% of the matching groups are not actually paid
out. Therefore, the actual payoff of a Person A depends on her own decision and on whether her
matching group was randomly chosen, respectively. The actual payoff of a Person B depends on
the decision of Person A and on whether her matching group was randomly chosen, respectively.
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Treatment Dec50 (Probabilistic Decision Selection)
Bitte beachten Sie:
Jedem Teilnehmer wird zunächst zufällig die Rolle von Person A oder die Rolle von Person B
zugeordnet
Nach der Zuordnung hat genau die Hälfte der Teilnehmer die Rolle von Person A. Die andere Hälfte
der Teilnehmer hat die Rolle von Person B.
Jeder Person A wird zufällig eine Person B zugeordnet.
Person A trifft die beschriebene Entscheidung zweimal.
Bei der zweiten Entscheidung bleiben die Rollen und die Zuordnung der Teilnehmer dieselben.
Es wird eine Entscheidung von Person A mit einer Wahrscheinlichkeit von 50 % gewählt, welche die
Auszahlungen von Person A und Person B bestimmt.
Die Auszahlung einer Person A hängt jeweils mit einer Wahrscheinlichkeit von 50% von ihrer ersten
oder von ihrer zweiten Entscheidung ab.
Die Auszahlung einer Person B hängt jeweils mit einer Wahrscheinlichkeit von 50% von der ersten
oder von der zweiten Entscheidung von Person A innerhalb einer Zuordnung ab.
Please note: Every participant is first randomly assigned the role of Person A or the role of Person
B. After the assignment, exactly half of the participants have the role of Person A. The other
half of the participants have the role of Person B. Every Person A is randomly matched with a
Person B. Person A makes the described decision twice. For the second decision, the participants’
roles and the matching of Person A and Person B remain the same. One decision of Person A is
randomly chosen with a probability of 50% and determines the payoffs. The payoff of a Person A
depends, with a probability of 50%, on her first or on her second decision, respectively. The payoff
of a Person B depends, with a probability of 50%, on the first or on the second decision of Person
A within a matching group, respectively.
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Treatment Rol50 (Role Uncertainty)
Bitte beachten Sie:
Jeder Teilnehmer entscheidet zunächst in der Rolle von Person A.
Jeder Teilnehmer trifft die beschriebene Entscheidung einmal.
Danach wird jedem Teilnehmer zufällig die Rolle von Person A oder die Rolle von Person B zuge-
ordnet.
Nach der Zuordnung hat genau die Hälfte der Teilnehmer tatsächlich die Rolle von Person A. Die
andere Hälfte der Teilnehmer hat die Rolle von Person B.
Jeder Person A wird zufällig eine Person B zugeordnet.
Die Auszahlung einer Person A hängt von ihrer Entscheidung, die sie als Person A getroffen hat, ab.
Die Auszahlung einer Person B hängt jeweils von der Entscheidung von Person A innerhalb einer
Zuordnung ab.
Please note: Every participant first takes a decision in the role of Person A. Every participant
makes the described decision once. Then, every participant is randomly assigned the role of Person
A or the role of Person B. After the assignment, exactly half of the participants have the role of
Person A. The other half of the participants have the role of Person B. Every Person A is randomly
matched with a Person B. The payoff of a Person A depends on the decision she has taken in the
role of Person A. The payoff of a Person B depends on the decision of Person A within a matching
group, respectively.
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TreatmentDeRo25 (Probabilistic Decision Selection and Role Uncertainty)
Bitte beachten Sie: Jeder Teilnehmer entscheidet zunächst in der Rolle von Person A.
Person A trifft die beschriebene Entscheidung zweimal. Danach wird jedem Teilnehmer zufällig die
Rolle von Person A oder die Rolle von Person B zugeordnet.
Nach der Zuordnung hat genau die Hälfte der Teilnehmer tatsächlich die Rolle von Person A. Die
andere Hälfte der Teilnehmer hat tatsächlich die Rolle von Person B.
Jeder Person A wird zufällig eine Person B zugeordnet.
Es wird eine Entscheidung von Person A mit einer Wahrscheinlichkeit von 50 % gewählt, welche die
Auszahlungen von Person A und Person B bestimmt.
Die Auszahlung einer Person A hängt jeweils mit einer Wahrscheinlichkeit von 50% von ihrer ersten
oder von ihrer zweiten Entscheidung ab.
Die Auszahlung einer Person B hängt jeweils mit einer Wahrscheinlichkeit von 50% von der ersten
oder von der zweiten Entscheidung von Person A innerhalb einer Zuordnung ab.
Please note: Every participant first takes a decision in the role of Person A. Every participant
makes the described decision twice. Then, every participant is randomly assigned the role of Person
A or the role of Person B. After the assignment, exactly half of the participants have the role of
Person A. The other half of the participants have the role of Person B. Every Person A is randomly
matched with a Person B. One decision of Person A is randomly chosen with a probability of 50%
and determines the payoffs. The payoff of a Person A depends, with a probability of 50%, on her
first or on her second decision, respectively. The payoff of a Person B depends, with a probability
of 50%, on the first or on the second decision of Person A within a matching group, respectively.
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Appendix B: Stages of the Experiment
Table 7: Stages of the Experiment
1. Introduction
2. Dictator Game(s): N-N, N-N/2, Pay50, Dec50, Rol50, DeRo25
3. Comprehension questions
4. Empirical and normative Beliefs
5a. Social Value Orientation 5b. Personal Values Questionnaire
6a. Personal Values Questionnaire 6b. Social Values Orientation
7. Big 5 Personality Questionnaire
8. Donation Task
9. Sociodemographics Questionnaire
10. Payout
Notes. In the stages 5 and 6, half of the subjects first completed the SVO measure (a) and
half of the subjects (b) started with the values questionnaire.
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Appendix C: Session Plan
Table 8: Session Plan
Session No. Week Date Day Time Treatment
1 1 May 23, 2017 Tuesday 9:00 - 10:15 N-N
2 1 May 23, 2017 Tuesday 11:00 - 12:15 Dec50
3 1 May 24, 2017 Wednesday 9:00 - 10:15 N-N/2
4 1 May 24, 2017 Wednesday 11:00 - 12:15 DeRo25
5 2 May 30, 2017 Tuesday 9:00 - 10:15 Dec50
6 2 May 30, 2017 Tuesday 11:00 - 12:15 N-N/2
7 2 May 31, 2017 Wednesday 9:00 - 10:15 Rol50
8 2 May 31, 2017 Wednesday 11:00 - 12:15 N-N
9 3 July 25, 2017 Tuesday 9:00 - 10:15 Pay50
10 3 July 26, 2017 Wednesday 11:00 - 12:15 Pay50
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Appendix D: Fehr-Schmidt Predictions
Table 9: Fehr-Schmidt Predictions
x PD PD · (10 - x) PR β xi - xj PR · β · (xi - xj) UD(x)
Treatment: N-N
0 1 10 1 0.6 10 6 4
1 1 9 1 0.6 8 4.8 4.2
2 1 8 1 0.6 6 3.6. 4.4
3 1 7 1 0.6 4 2.4 4.6
4 1 6 1 0.6 2 1.2 4.8
5 1 5 1 0.6 0 0 5*
Treatment: N-N/2
0 1 10 0.5 0.6 10 3 7*
1 1 9 0.5 0.6 8 2.4 6.6
2 1 8 0.5 0.6 6 1.8 6.2
3 1 7 0.5 0.6 4 1.2 5.8
4 1 6 0.5 0.6 2 0.6 5.4
5 1 5 0.5 0.6 0 0 5
Treatment: Pay50, Dec50, Rol50
0 0.5 5 0.5 0.6 5 1 3.5*
1 0.5 4.5 0.5 0.6 3.5 1.05 3.45
2 0.5 4 0.5 0.6 2 0.6 3.4
3 0.5 3.5 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.15 3.35
Treatment: DeRo25
0 0.25 2.5 0.25 0.6 2.5 0.375 2.125*
1 0.25 2.25 0.25 0.6 1.25 0.1875 2.0625
2 0.25 2 0.25 0.6 0 0 2
Notes. x=dictator transfer, PD (PR) is the probability for a dictator’s decision to affect the payoff
of the respective dictator in a specific dictator game (the probability for a dictator’s decision to
affect the payoff of a randomly regarded receiver in a specific dictator game), β is the inequity
aversion parameter of the dictator, xi (xj) is the payoff of the dictator (receiver). * marks the
optimal choice for the dictator, i.e., the transfer that generates the highest utility UD(x).
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Appendix E: Distribution of Transfers
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Figure 1: Transfers across Treatments
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Appendix F: Schwartz Values
Table 10: The Ten Basic Personal Values
Value Description
Self-direction Independent thought and action – choosing, creating, exploring
Stimulation Excitement, novelty, and challenge in life
Hedonism Pleasure and sensuous gratification for oneself
Achievement Personal success through demonstrating competence according
to social standards
Power Social status and prestige, control or dominance over people and
resources
Security Safety, harmony, and stability of society, of relationships, and of
self
Tradition Respect, commitment, and acceptance of the customs and ideas
that traditional culture or religion provides
Conformity Restraint of actions, inclinations, and impulses likely to upset or
harm others and violate social expectations or norms
Benevolence Preservation and enhancement of the welfare of people with
whom one is in frequent personal contact
Universalism Understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and protection for the
welfare of all people and for nature
Self-Transcendence Transcending one’s own interests for the sake of others
(calculated by the mean of Benevolence and Universalism
Values)
Self-Enhancement Pursuing one’s own interests (calculated by the mean of
Achievement and Power Values)
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Appendix H: Donation Task
Description of the task
Vielen Dank für Ihre Teilnahme an diesem Experiment.
Für Ihre Teilnahme erhalten Sie wie immer einen Festbetrag in Höhe von 4 Euro (=400 Cent).
Trotz vieler Fortschritte im Kampf gegen Malaria sterben weltweit jährlich noch immer 800.000
Kinder an den Folgen. Typische Symptome für Malaria sind Kopfschmerzen, Erschöpfung und
Muskelschmerzen. Wiederkehrende heftige Fieberanfälle können tödlich sein. Malaria ist jedoch
heilbar. Doch nur jedes dritte erkrankte Kind erhält rechtzeitig Medikamente, die dafür notwendig
wären. Moderne ACT-Kombinationspräparate helfen gegen die gefürchtete Fieberkrankheit. Ein an
Malaria erkranktes Kind erhält sie zweimal täglich, etwa drei Tage lang. Im Kampf gegen Malaria
können auch kleine Spenden hilfreich sein und viel bewirken. (Auskunft laut Webseite von UNICEF).
Sie können nun bestimmen, ob und wie viel Sie zur Unterstützung von UNICEF spenden wollen. Sie
können diese Entscheidung vollkommen frei und anonym treffen. Der Betrag, den Sie spenden, wird
dafür verwendet werden, Malaria-Medikamente für Kinder zu kaufen, damit diese damit behandelt
und geheilt werden können. Mit Ihrer Spende können Sie daher helfen, Kinder vor Malaria zu
schützen. Ihr Spendenbetrag wird nach Beendigung der Studie durch die Studienleiter für den Kauf
von Malariamedikamenten für Kinder gespendet. Die Belege dafür können auf Nachfrage bei den
Studienleitern eingesehen werden.
Ich möchte gern folgenden Betrag an UNICEF spenden (bitte tragen Sie hier einen Wert zwischen
0 und 400 Cent ein):
Thank you for your participation in this experiment.
As always, you will receive a fixed amount of 4 Euro (= 400 cents) for your participation. In spite
of the many advances in the fight against malaria, 800,000 children worldwide still die from its
consequences every year. Typical symptoms of malaria are headache, fatigue, and muscle pain.
Recurring violent fever attacks can be fatal. Malaria is, however, curable. But only one out of
every three sick children receives necessary medication in time. Modern ACT combination drugs
help against the fevered febrile disease. A child suffering from malaria receives it twice daily,
for about three days. In the fight against malaria, small donations can also be helpful and have
a significant impact (according to the UNICEF website). You can now determine if, and how
much, you want to donate to support UNICEF. You can make this decision completely freely and
anonymously. The amount you donate will be used to buy malaria drugs for children so that they
can be treated and cured. With your donation, you can help protect children from malaria. Your
donation amount will be donated by the experimenters after completion of the study for the purchase
of malaria drugs for children. The receipts can be viewed on request by the study directors. I would
like to donate the following amount to UNICEF (please enter an amount between 0 and 400 cents):
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Payment receipt (first wave)
Figure 2: Donation Receipt for Dictators and Receivers (first Wave)
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Payment receipt (second wave)
Figure 3: Donation Receipt for Dictators and Receivers (second Wave)
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Appendix H: Correlations of Complementary Generosity Measures
Table 11: Correlations of Complementary Generosity Measures
Correlation Dictators (n=192)
Self-Transcendence Values and SVO angle 0.289***
Self-Transcendence Values and donation 0.216***
Self-Transcendence Values and Agreeableness 0.604***
Self-Enhancement Values and SVO angle -0.224***
Self-Enhancement Values and donation -0.116
Self-Enhancement Values and Agreeableness -0.567***
SVO angle and donation 0.321***
SVO angle and Agreeableness 0.270***
Donation and Agreeableness 0.251***
Notes. Spearman correlation coefficients. SVO=Social Value Orientation. Significance
levels: ∗∗∗ p<.01, ∗∗ p<.05, ∗ p<.1
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